ΕΚΔΗΛΩΣΕΙΣ

ΣΕΜΙΝΑΡΙΟ ΣΤΑΤΙΣΤΙΚΗΣ & ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΗΣ ΕΡΕΥΝΑΣ - COORDINATION IN DECENTRALISED SETTINGS UNDER BILATERAL INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

Wednesday 22 Μαρτίου 2023 ΑΙΘΟΥΣΑ Γ22

Ημερομηνία: Τετάρτη 22 Μαρτίου 2023
Ώρα: 15:30
Τόπος: Αίθουσα Γ22
Oμιλητής: Δημήτρη Ζήση (Τμήμα Διοικητικής Επιστήμης, ΑΣΣΟΕ)
Τίτλος: Coordination in Decentralised Settings under Bilateral Information Asymmetry
Περίληψη: In decentralized settings (such as markets, supply chains, etc.) different agents interact with each other to achieve some common objective. However, due to the presence of asymmetric information, each agent has access to information that is not available to others. As a result, the agents may have different preferences and objectives; and there is a risk that agents may act in their own self-interest, leading to suboptimal outcomes for the entire setting. This creates coordination challenges affecting the effectiveness of the system and restricting the benefits that are allocated among the parties.

The main objective of this work is to examine if different decision makers could coordinate their actions in a decentralised setting under information asymmetries. A model with two independent agents is considered; both agents are rational decision makers and determine their actions seeking to maximise solely their own utility functions. They have private information and are forced to interact with each other, because no alternatives for external interaction are allowed. The agents are the only ones that know their own information; so, no one can prevent them from lying about it. To reach coordination, a mechanism (screening device) is designed to induce the parties to reveal their information.

It is shown that if the mechanism includes appropriate incentives, agents will share honestly their information, because it is in their self-interest. Moreover, it is proved that coordination is always attainable even under bilateral information asymmetry and exact expressions for the optimal agents’ strategies are devised. An interesting feature is that the acceptable cost allocation under coordination is not unique, providing adequate flexibility during the mechanism design phase.